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We introduce a protocol for authenticated teleportation, which can be proven secure even when
the receiver does not trust their measurement devices, and is experimentally accessible. We use the
technique of self-testing from the device-independent approach to quantum information, where we
can characterise quantum states and measurements from the exhibited classical correlations alone.
First, we derive self-testing bounds for the Bell state and Pauli σX , σZ measurements, that are robust
enough to be implemented in the lab. Then, we use these to determine a lower bound on the fidelity
of an untested entangled state to be used for teleportation. Finally, we apply our results to propose
an experimentally feasible protocol for one-sided device-independent authenticated teleportation.
This can be interpreted as a first practical authentication of a quantum channel, with additional
one-sided device-independence.
Quantum teleportation is well-established as a corner-
stone of the field of quantum information, allowing the
transfer of a qubit from one party to another using an en-
tangled pair and a classical communication channel [1].
While interesting in its own right, it is also a key in-
gredient in many protocols, such as secret sharing [2, 3],
anonymous transmission [4] and multiparty computation
[5], and is an important tool across quantum information.
From a cryptographic point of view, it is then vital to
study the security of teleportation. We consider authen-
ticated teleportation, where we wish to verify that the
teleportation has succeeded even when we do not trust
the entangled pair being used. This authenticates its
application as a quantum channel between the two par-
ties. Previous schemes for authentication of a quantum
channel, such as [6], rely on generating large entangled
states or performing entangling measurements. In order
to guarantee high security of such protocols, one would
need levels of entanglement that are, in practice, unfea-
sible. We solve this problem and go one step further:
allowing Alice and Bob to authenticate their quantum
channel even when their devices may not be trusted.
Device-independence has become a highly desirable
feature of quantum communication and computation pro-
tocols, from its early applications to quantum key dis-
tribution [7–9] and quantum random number generation
[10, 11]. This approach addresses the situation where
the untrusted components may have been obtained from,
or be in the control of, an adversary. In the two party
setting, one can consider two trust settings: one-sided
device-independent (1sDI), where Alice trusts her de-
vice but Bob does not (or vice versa), and fully device-
independent (DI), where neither party trusts their de-
vices. One-sided trust should allow for a much simpler
experimental implementation as in [12–14]. This sce-
nario is particularly relevant when one party is natu-
rally trusted, for example, a trusted client but untrusted
server, or simply if the channel and local measurement
device are untrusted when one may wish to receive a re-
source (for example, a magic state for computation, or a
particular entangled state for metrology).
In this work, we introduce a 1sDI protocol for authen-
ticated teleportation. To achieve this, we present a pro-
tocol and security bounds for testing the entangled state
which will be used for the teleportation, in a 1sDI way.
The idea is essentially to request many entangled states,
all but one of which are used as test runs, and the re-
maining one used for teleportation. Note that here, as
in all authentication of quantum channels [6], one nec-
essarily assumes an authenticated classical channel (or
equivalently, a secure shared random key). Along the
way, we will present some results for the full DI setting
and discuss their application at the end. Finally, we ar-
gue that our protocol can be implemented with today’s
experimental capabilities.
Outline.— Building our protocol requires a few key in-
gredients. Firstly, we use the technique of self-testing, by
which untrusted states and measurements can be charac-
terised, in a device-independent scenario, by the exhib-
ited correlations alone. From its beginnings by Mayers
and Yao [15], self-testing results now encompass a vari-
ety of different states [16–21], measurements [22–24], and
trust settings [25, 26]. For our application to teleporta-
tion, we focus on certifying the fidelity of the Bell state
and the Pauli measurements.
By self-testing the Bell state, one can establish the
closeness of an untrusted state with the Bell state, up
to local isometry, from correlations such as the amount
of violation of the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH)
inequality [27]. While many self-testing results exist for
the Bell state [16, 25, 28], only recently do we have tech-
niques which are robust enough to be used in practice
[23, 29, 30]. Self-testing a measurement certifies that,
despite the possible presence of additional ancillae, the
measurement operators act close to ideally on the Bell
state, and trivially on the rest of the system. There are
several results in this direction [16, 22, 23, 25, 26], how-
ever, no work so far has obtained a practically robust
self-testing bound for the measurements.
We start by expanding on the method introduced in
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2[23], known as the SWAP method, to derive full self-
testing bounds for the Bell pair that incorporate both the
state and Pauli σX , σZ measurements, in both the 1sDI
and DI settings. Our new bounds are practically robust.
However, in this approach they are not immediately
adapted to our requirements for several reasons. Firstly,
they are based on the common self-testing assumptions
of an infinite number of independent runs, throughout
which the untrusted components behave identically (iid).
In a realistic, adversarial scenario, we cannot rely on such
assumptions, and so by adapting the methods of [25, 31],
we remove these entirely. Secondly, the security state-
ments that one achieves refer to the states that have been
measured (hence cannot naively be used for ensuring the
quality of the entangled pair used for teleportation). To
address this, we incorporate a final, untested state in our
analysis, and obtain a bound on the fidelity of telepor-
tation using this state. This marks a departure from
the usual self-testing works, which certify a state already
consumed in the testing process. Recent work by Arnon-
Friedman and Bancal [32] also considered this in their
non-iid entanglement certification scheme, however they
focus on certifying distillable entanglement rather than
quantifying the closeness of a state to the ideal.
To demonstrate the experimental feasibility of our pro-
tocol, we give explicit values of the parameters we require
to certify any fidelity of the teleportation, giving both
the number of states and the violation of the inequal-
ity required. Our results are within current experimental
limitations [33, 34].
Self-testing.— Our first goal is to derive full, robust
self-testing bounds for the Bell pair (|00〉+ |11〉)/√2 and
Pauli measurements σX , σZ , thus adding to the work of
[26] in the 1sDI setting, and [23] in the DI setting. In
order to do so, we use the same framework as defined
there.
In a device-independent scenario, one can only certify
the state and measurements up to local isometry. Any
local unitary transformation, or the presence of addi-
tional systems upon which the measurements act triv-
ially, would result in the same correlations and so would
not be detected. The dimension of the Hilbert space of
the untrusted side is unrestricted, thus we can take the
state to be pure and the measurements to be projective
without loss of generality.
We start with considering the 1sDI setting. In this
setting, it is relevant to look at steering correlations [35].
Colloquially speaking, a quantum system is said to ex-
hibit steering if one party making local measurements
can steer the qubit of the other party to a certain state.
Analogous to the Bell inequality case, one can express
this capacity via inequalities. For example, if Alice mea-
sures either one of the observables A0, A1, and Bob in one
of B0, B1, one is said to observe steering if the following
inequality [36] is violated:
|〈A0B0〉+ 〈A1B1〉| ≤
√
2. (1)
A violation of the inequality implies entanglement be-
tween the two parties. Further, a maximal violation of
2 can be demonstrated for the Bell pair under consider-
ation if the observables are A0 = B0 = σX , A1 = B1 =
σZ . We now give the definition of self-testing that we
wish to make for the 1sDI setting, where the fidelity
F (|Θ〉 , |Ω〉) = |〈Θ|Ω〉|2.
Definition 1. Let
∣∣ψ〉 denote the ideal Bell state, and
MA, NB ∈ {σX , σZ} be the ideal Pauli measurements
of Alice and Bob respectively. Let |ψ〉 denote the un-
trusted shared state, and NB ∈ {XB , ZB} be Bob’s un-
trusted measurements. Given the parties observe a near-
maximal violation 2 −  of the steering inequality (1),
we have achieved robust self-testing if there exists some
isometry Φ : HB → HB ⊗HB′ such that
F
(
trB [Φ(|ψ〉 〈ψ|)],
∣∣ψ〉 ) ≥ 1− f() (2)
F
(
trB [Φ(|ψ′〉 〈ψ′|)],MA ⊗NB
∣∣ψ〉 ) ≥ 1− f ′() (3)
where |ψ′〉 = MA ⊗ NB |ψ〉 and f(), f ′() are known
simple functions of .
Note that, as is typical for self-testing statements, this
bound effectively assumes an infinite number of iid copies
of the state and measurements in order to approximate
the violation and map it to the fidelity, and it is a state-
ment on the state of the measured pairs.
We can define a similar statement for the DI set-
ting, where now Alice’s measurement MA is also un-
trusted. In this case the parties must observe a near-
maximal violation of the CHSH inequality [27], given by
|〈A0B0〉+ 〈A1B0〉+ 〈A0B1〉 − 〈A1B1〉| ≤ 2, and maxi-
mally violated at the Tsirelson bound of 2
√
2 [37].
Our first aim is to determine forms of the functions
f(), f ′(), for both the 1sDI and DI settings, that are
practically robust i.e. give a non-trivial fidelity for ex-
perimentally observable violations of the inequality. For
Equation (2), such bounds for the state are already given
in [23, 26], by semidefinite programming (SDP) and the
SWAP isometry. We use their method to derive new
bounds which, for the measurements, are significantly
more robust than previous analytical results [16, 25, 26].
Our results are given in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. (a) In the 1sDI setting, if the parties ob-
serve a 2− violation of the steering inequality (1),
then f() = 1.26, f ′() = 3.10.
(b) In the DI setting, if the parties observe a 2
√
2 − 
violation of the CHSH inequality [27], then f() =
1.19, f ′() = 3.70.
3Proof sketch. In the 1sDI case, let us denote Eb|y as the
projector associated with Bob measuring in setting y
and getting outcome b. Then, Alice’s resulting condi-
tional state is represented by the assemblage given by
τb|y = trB(1A ⊗ Eb|y |ψ〉 〈ψ|), which is equal to the re-
sulting state times its probability. In the DI case, we
also consider Alice’s projector Da|x, such that the prob-
ability distribution is given by p(a, b|x, y) = trAB(Da|x ⊗
Eb|y |ψ〉 〈ψ|).
We then adopt the techniques of [23], where by apply-
ing the SWAP isometry, we determine expressions for the
fidelity measures in Equations (2) and (3). We write our
fidelity measures and inequality violations in terms of as-
semblage elements for the 1sDI setting, and expectation
values of combinations of Alice and Bob’s measurement
operators for the DI setting (see Appendix A for more
details). Next, we introduce a positive semidefinite vari-
able Γ, which is the moment matrix from the Navascue´s-
Pironio-Ac´ın (NPA) hierarchy [38, 39], constructed such
that now, the fidelity and inequality expressions can be
written as a function of Γ. Since we wish to obtain a lower
bound on the fidelity measures, we then use an SDP to
find the minimum value of our expressions for Equations
(2) and (3) which are compatible with the amount of
violation of the inequality.
As we shift from self-testing the state to the measure-
ments, the size of Γ and the difficulty of the problem
increases, particularly in constraining the structure of Γ.
We solve this issue by automating the constraint gener-
ation step. The full proof is given in Appendix A.
From now on, we will denote the constant term by α,
such that the bounds in Theorem 1 can be written as
f(), f ′() = α, where α depends on the trust setting
and whether we wish to use the self-testing bound for
the state, or both state and measurements.
Authenticated teleportation.— We are now ready to
build our protocol for authenticated teleportation with
untrusted devices. As mentioned, we cannot directly ap-
ply our results from Theorem 1, as they are valid under
the assumptions of an infinite number of iid rounds (ap-
pearing in the use of expectation values in the SDP). In
any experiment, by doing a finite number of runs we can
only get an estimation of the expectation values required
for our inequality. Thus, if we want to use Theorem 1 to
propose a realistic verification protocol, we must also de-
termine the number of runs required to approximate the
expectation values to our desired precision. We consider
the case of the iid assumption, and then remove this al-
together for the fully adversarial setting. In this way, we
define a scheme for 1sDI authenticated teleportation in
Protocol 1.
The main idea of Protocol 1 is as follows. The source is
asked for many copies of the Bell pair. One copy is ran-
domly chosen that will be used, and the rest are tested
for steering using inequality (1). If it passes, the remain-
Protocol 1 1sDI authenticated teleportation
1: Parameters , q, x are agreed, depending on the experi-
mental limitations, and the fidelity of teleportation that
the parties wish to certify.
2: The source is instructed to prepare
• K = d 4q2x
2
log 1

+ 1e Bell pairs in the iid setting,
or
• K = d 16q2x
2
log 1

+ 1e Bell pairs in the non-iid set-
ting,
and send the shares to Alice and Bob. (d.e denotes the
ceiling function.)
3: Alice randomly chooses a pair r to be used for the tele-
portation, and sends the value r to Bob.
4: Alice randomly divides the set of remaining pairs into two
subsets, S0 and S1, each of size K−12 .
5: For each pair i ∈ St:
(a) Alice measures observable At and gets outcome ai.
(b) She tells Bob to measure observable Bt and he gets
outcome bi.
(c) Alice and Bob calculate their correlation for round
i as Cˆi = aibi.
6: Alice and Bob calculate their average correlation over all
rounds.
7: If their average correlation has deviation  from maximal
violation of the steering inequality (1), Alice uses pair r
to teleport the secret to Bob.
ing pair is used to teleport. If the source and devices
behave as they should, the tests will always pass, and
the teleported state is perfect. On the other hand, if the
source is malicious, it cannot know which pair will be
used and which pairs will be tested, and so if it supplies
non-ideal states, it will sometimes fail the test. Further,
the self-testing statements for the test mean that Bob’s
security holds even with untrusted devices on Bob’s side.
Theorem 2 characterises the final untested state that is
used as the quantum resource for teleportation, for both
the case where we assume an iid source and the non-iid
setting. Our proof for the non-iid case is based on tech-
niques from [25] to certify the fidelity of any randomly
chosen state, as opposed to at least one state as in [23].
Theorem 2. The fidelity of the entangled state used for
teleportation in step 7 of Protocol 1 (up to local isometry)
is bounded in the iid setting with probability at least (1−
x) by
F ≥ 1− α
[2
q
+ 
]
, (4)
and in the non-iid setting with probability at least (1 −
4x)(1−
√
α[ 2q +

2 +
4q2x log 1+2
2
8q2x log 1+
2 ]) by
F ≥ 1−
√
α
[2
q
+

2
+
4q2x log 1 + 2
2
8q2x log 1 + 
2
]
, (5)
where α = 1.26.
Proof sketch. In Protocol 1, the final Bell pair is accepted
in step 7 if, for all previous tested pairs, the measured
average correlation was -close to the correlation for an
ideal pair. Our aim is to use this information to bound
the fidelity of the final untested state that we wish to use
for teleportation.
First, following the method of [25], we determine the
closeness between the true correlation (i.e. the expecta-
tion value) and the ideal correlation, using this measured
correlation. In the iid case, we do this by taking the mea-
surement outcomes to be independent random variables,
and then using the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound [40, 41]. In
the non-iid case, we instead use the martingale approach
of Pironio et al. [11] and apply the Azuma-Hoeffding in-
equality [41, 42].
In our analysis, we also take into account the untested
state r, which is straightforward if we assume an iid
source. For the non-iid case, we do this by consider-
ing the maximum hypothetical deviation from the ideal
correlation as in [31].
At this stage, we have an expression for the amount
of violation of our steering inequality from the measured
average correlations. Then, we apply our result from
Theorem 1 to bound the fidelity of the average state.
Our final result is a bound on any state prepared by the
source, including state r which is used for teleportation.
We introduce the parameters q, x in order to tailor our
protocol to possible experimental implementations, de-
pending on the relative ease of generating many states
or observing a high violation of the inequality. The full
proof is given in Appendix B.
The bound on the fidelity of teleportation directly fol-
lows from this, as given in Corollary 3.
Corollary 3. The fidelity of the teleported state (up to
local isometry) in Protocol 1 is lower-bounded by Theorem
2.
Proof. It is known that the fidelity of teleportation is at
least as high as the fidelity of the entangled state used
for teleportation [43], thus our bound on the entangled
state also holds for the teleported state.
There is some flexibility in the protocol which would
not affect our results. For example, we have written it
such that Alice chooses the pair r, and essentially runs
the protocol, but this can be easily changed to Bob, or
a third party. Furthermore, as in [6, 44], it is possible to
make the protocol non-interactive by replacing the com-
munication between Alice and Bob with shared random
strings, indicating which copy to use for the teleporta-
tion, and which measurement setting to test each copy
with.
In the way that we propose our protocol above, a quan-
tum memory is needed to store the copies until they are
tested or used. To override this experimentally difficult
requirement, the source can generate Bell pairs on-the-fly,
and the parties either test or use each pair depending on
the chosen r. In this case, since we may not have checked
for our desired inequality violation before the teleporta-
tion step (for example, if r = 1 we immediately use the
state before any testing), we run the risk of teleporting
through a bad quantum channel. However, once we know
our inequality violation at the end of the protocol, we can
compute a bound on the fidelity of the teleportation from
Theorem 2. Another alternative would be to modify our
protocol in the style of Pappa et al. [45]. Here, one
would use the state with probability 2−K in each of the
K rounds and tested otherwise, and the parties abort if
any test fails. This would require an adaptation of the
above proof.
Finally, we note that the CHSH inequality can also be
used to witness steering. The analysis of Protocol 1 in
this case, including the number of pairs required, follows
from the proof of Theorem 2 by applying the relevant
self-testing result, and can be found in Appendix C.
Discussion and experimental feasibility.— First, we
compare the security and resources required in our proto-
col alongside that of [6]. While the protocol in [6] has an
exponential scaling with the security parameter, the size
of the encoding, effectively the entanglement, increases
with the desired security level. On the other hand, our
protocol only uses multiple copies of the Bell pair. As we
outline below, due to the ease of generating entangled
pairs (compared to high entanglement), our protocol is
practically feasible. Furthermore, our protocol is secure
even in the case where devices are not trusted, not dealt
with in [6].
Next, we discuss our self-testing results for the Pauli
measurements, given as a fidelity measure. Using a steer-
ing inequality violation of at least 1.94 in the 1sDI case,
or a CHSH violation of 2.78 in the DI case, one can certify
a fidelity greater than 80%. As Bell violations as high as
2.82 have been observed [34], our bounds are sufficiently
robust to be experimentally useful.
To facilitate comparison with previous works, our
bounds in Theorem 1 are given in the same form as the
literature in Table III (Appendix A). We see that we
have improved upon all existing full self-testing bounds
for the state and measurements in both the 1sDI and
DI settings. Kaniewski’s analytical approach [30] used a
different isometry than SWAP and resulted in a better
bound for the state in the DI setting. Any improved self-
5testing bound can directly be used to bound the fidelity
of teleportation in our protocol using Corollary 3 and the
parameter α.
We will now assess the experimental feasibility of Pro-
tocol 1. In order to do better than teleportation by clas-
sical communication, we require the fidelity of telepor-
tation to be greater than 23 [46]. For example, 1sDI au-
thenticated teleportation could be demonstrated, under
the iid (non-iid) assumption, by observing a steering in-
equality violation of 1.75 (1.92) using 105 (108) copies. If,
instead, the CHSH inequality was used as the test, one
would require a violation in the iid (non-iid) setting of
2.49 (2.73) with 106 (108) copies. These results are well
within the limits of experimental feasibility (see Figure
2 in Appendix C for a plot of our results). Additionally,
the number of copies required by our finite analysis is suf-
ficiently high so as to provide a good enough estimate of
the quantum distribution, meaning that we do not need
to employ regularisation methods as in [47]. Our scheme
is thus the first authenticated teleportation protocol that
is practical in its robustness, implementable with exist-
ing experimental setups, and further, tolerates untrusted
devices.
We now comment on possible extensions of this work.
Note that our protocol is a one-sided device-independent
method of authenticating the quantum channel in tele-
portation. One can use our results to do a fully DI
test of the Bell pair (the required parameters are given
in Appendix C), but in order to go for a fully device-
independent teleportation scheme, we must also consider
self-testing of the Bell state measurement performed by
Alice. Recently, work by Renou et al. [48] and Bancal et
al. [49] have focused on this particular problem. While
[49] gives practically robust bounds, they still assume iid
and infinite runs, as is common in self-testing. Thus, we
cannot directly apply these results to our protocol, and
it remains as further work.
Finally, we emphasise that teleportation is not the only
application of our work. Our results in Theorem 2 for the
1sDI setting, and in Appendix C for the DI setting, give
a bound on the fidelity of the final untested state, which
can then be used for a variety of other applications such
as verified quantum computation.
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APPENDIX A: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Theorem 1. (a) In the 1sDI setting, if the parties ob-
serve a 2 −  violation of the steering inequality,
then f() = 1.26, f ′() = 3.10.
(b) In the DI setting, if the parties observe a 2
√
2 −
 violation of the CHSH inequality, then f() =
1.19, f ′() = 3.70.
Proof. Our proof is given in the following subsections.
71. Fidelity expressions for 1sDI
We first look at how to get an expression for the fidelity
of the self-testing where we follow and extend the method
of [26], using the SWAP isometry, which will later be fed
into the SDP optimisation. Let Bob’s untrusted device
be a black box with measurement settings y ∈ {0, 1} and
outcomes b ∈ {0, 1}. The untrusted measurements made
by Bob are then written in terms of the projectors Eb|y
as XB = 2E0|1 − 1, ZB = 2E0|0 − 1.
The SWAP isometry Φ = 1A⊗ΦB (Figure 1), the stan-
dard in self-testing literature, performs the SWAP oper-
ation if the untrusted devices are operating correctly. It
is composed of adding a trusted ancilla in a known state
(|+〉) to Bob’s subsystem, and then a unitary transfor-
mation which swaps part of the untrusted state onto the
ancilla, resulting in a two-qubit state.
The unitary transformation is written in such a way
that it incorporates Bob’s untrusted operators that we
wish to test. Denoting Bob’s system as B and his an-
cilla system as B′, this transformation is given by V HU ,
where
V = |0〉 〈0|B′ ⊗ 1B + |1〉 〈1|B′ ⊗XB , (6)
H = |+〉 〈0|B′ + |−〉 〈1|B′ , (7)
U = |0〉 〈0|B′ ⊗ 1B + |1〉 〈1|B′ ⊗ ZB . (8)
The isometry then acts on the untrusted state as
Φ(|ψ〉) = 1A ⊗ (V HU)B′B |ψ〉AB |+〉B′ . (9)
To self-test the state, we will determine a bound on the fi-
delity F (trB [Φ(|ψ〉 〈ψ|)],
∣∣ψ〉) = 〈ψ∣∣ trB[Φ(|ψ〉 〈ψ|)] ∣∣ψ〉.
In addition, we wish to self-test the untrusted mea-
surement operators NB . To study this, we look at the
action of the isometry given by
Φ(1A ⊗NB |ψ〉) = 1A ⊗ (V HU)B′B1A ⊗NB |ψ〉AB |+〉B′ .
(10)
In the ideal case, we have 1A ⊗ NB
∣∣ψ〉. We will deter-
mine the closeness between these two expressions, and
denoting |ψ′〉 = MA ⊗NB |ψ〉, we will compute a bound
on the fidelity F (trB [Φ(|ψ′〉 〈ψ′|)],MA ⊗NB
∣∣ψ〉).
Our fidelity expressions will be in terms of assemblages
on Alice’s side, given by τb|y = trB(1A ⊗ Eb|y |ψ〉 〈ψ|).
The full forms of these expressions are given in Table I.
2. Fidelity expressions for DI
We use a similar framework for self-testing in the DI
setting, following [23]. Since both Alice and Bob’s de-
vices are now untrusted, we apply the SWAP isometry
to both parties’ systems to extract a Bell pair. For ease
| i
|+iB0
|anci | i
H
Z XB
A
FIG. 1: The SWAP isometry applied to Bob’s system for self-
testing the state |ψ〉.
of calculations, we now take the ideal state to be
∣∣ψ〉 = 1√
2

cos (pi8 )
sin (pi8 )
sin (pi8 )
− cos (pi8 )
 , (11)
which is equivalent to the Bell state up to local unitaries.
This state maximally violates the CHSH inequality if Al-
ice and Bob measure the σZ , σX operators, which simpli-
fies our analysis. The isometry Φ = ΦA ⊗ ΦB performs
the same SWAP operation here, but we write it slightly
differently to follow [23]. The ancilla on both parties’
systems A′, B′ is initialised in state |0〉, and the unitary
transformation is now written as V RV , where V is de-
fined as before and R is given by
R = 1A′ ⊗
(1A + ZA
2
)
+ σXA′ ⊗
(1A − ZA
2
)
(12)
on Alice’s side, for example. For self-testing the state,
we then have
Φ(|ψ〉) = (V RV )A′A ⊗ (V RV )B′B |ψ〉AB ⊗ |00〉A′B′ .
(13)
The fidelity is given by F (trAB [Φ(|ψ〉 〈ψ|)],
∣∣ψ〉) =〈
ψ
∣∣ trAB[Φ(|ψ〉 〈ψ|)] ∣∣ψ〉.
For self-testing the measurements, we now denote Al-
ice’s untrusted measurement operator as MA and |ψ′〉 =
MA ⊗NB |ψ〉. After applying the isometry, we have
Φ(MA ⊗NB |ψ〉) =
(V RV )A′A ⊗ (V RV )B′BMA ⊗NB |ψ〉AB |00〉A′B′ .
(14)
The ideal operators acting on the ideal state
gives
∣∣ψ′〉 = MA ⊗ NB ∣∣ψ〉. The fidelity is then
given by F (trAB [Φ(|ψ′〉 〈ψ′|)],MA ⊗ NB
∣∣ψ〉) =〈
ψ′
∣∣ trAB [Φ(|ψ′〉 〈ψ′|)] ∣∣ψ′〉.
The full forms of these fidelity expressions are given in
Table II.
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State
1
2
[
〈0A| τ0|0 |0A〉+ 〈0A| (2τ0|1,0|0 − 2τ0|0,0|1,0|0) |1A〉
+ 〈1A| (2τ0|0,0|1 − 2τ0|0,0|1,0|0) |0A〉+ 〈1A| (ρA − τ0|0) |1A〉
]
ZB
1
2
[
〈0A| τ0|0 |0A〉+ 〈0A| (2τ0|1,0|0 − 2τ0|0,0|1,0|0) |1A〉
+ 〈1A| (2τ0|0,0|1 − 2τ0|0,0|1,0|0) |0A〉+ 〈1A| (ρA − τ0|0) |1A〉
]
XB
1
2
[
〈0A| (ρA − τ0|0 − 4τ0|1,0|0,0|1 + 2τ0|0,0|1 + 2τ0|1,0|0) |0A〉
+ 〈0A| (−2τ0|0,0|1 + 4τ0|0,0|1,0|0,0|1 + 4τ0|1,0|0,0|1,0|0 + 4τ0|1,0|0,0|1 − 2τ0|0,0|1,0|0
− 8τ0|1,0|0,0|1,0|0,0|1) |1A〉+ 〈1A| (−2τ0|1,0|0 + 4τ0|0,0|1,0|0,0|1 + 4τ0|1,0|0,0|1,0|0 + 4τ0|1,0|0,0|1
− 2τ0|0,0|1,0|0 − 8τ0|1,0|0,0|1,0|0,0|1) |0A〉+ 〈1A| (4τ0|1,0|0,0|1 − 2τ0|0,0|1 − 2τ0|1,0|0 + τ0|0) |1A〉
]
TABLE I: Fidelity expressions for the 1sDI setting.
3. Constraints
Our aim is to then determine a bound on the fidelity
measures in Tables I - II, given an -near-maximal viola-
tion of the steering or CHSH inequalities.
In the 1sDI setting, these inequalities can be written in
the form of Alice’s trusted operators σX , σZ acting on as-
semblages that result from Bob measuring his untrusted
operators X,Z. We write our inequalities in terms of
assemblages on Alice’s side as
tr[σZ(2τ0|0 − ρA) + σX(2τ0|1 − ρA)] = 2− ,
(15)
tr[
√
2σZ(2τ0|0 − ρA) +
√
2σX(2τ0|1 − ρA)] = 2
√
2− ,
(16)
for the steering and CHSH inequalities, respectively.
In the DI case, where both parties’ devices are un-
trusted, they must demonstrate nonlocality by violating
the CHSH inequality.
4. Finding a bound via SDP
We then use an SDP to find the minimum value of our
fidelity expression consistent with the amount of viola-
tion of the inequality. It is formulated as follows:
minimise tr(PΓ)
such that Γ ≥ 0
tr(QΓ) = w. (17)
Here, Γ is the moment matrix from the NPA hierarchy
for characterising quantum correlations [38, 39]. In the
1sDI setting, the rows are given by a set of operators
that are some product of Bob’s projectors Eb|y written
as {E1, ..., Em}, the columns by the adjoints, and each el-
ement is given by Γkl = trB(E†l Ek |ψ〉 〈ψ|). Thus, Γ is an
m×m matrix composed of assemblage elements. In the
DI setting, the rows are given by a set of operators that
are some combination of both Alice and Bob’s operators
Ak, Bk, which results in the elements of Γ being expec-
tation values. It has been proven in [23, 26] that Γ is
positive semidefinite.
Our constraint is then given by the amount of violation
w of a suitable inequality. Formulating our problem in
terms of an SDP essentially amounts to finding a suitable
form of Γ that contains all the elements in our fidelity and
inequality expressions, writing these expressions in terms
of symmetric matrices P,Q acting on Γ, and constraining
the structure of Γ.
For self-testing the measurements, this final step is the
most time-consuming. For example, in the case of self-
testing the X ⊗ X measurement in the DI scenario, to
solve the SDP we require a Γ of size 81 × 81, which has
over 22, 000 constraints. To work around this problem,
we have automated this process of generating Γ and its
constraints, using a combination of C++ and Python
scripts. Our code takes as input the rows and columns
of Γ. It then generates all the entries of Γ, determines
which entries are equal to one another, and after some
processing, outputs a list of all the unique constraints, in
a format that can be directly entered into our SDP.
Once our SDP is set up, we solve it via CVX [50, 51],
giving the bounds in Theorem 1. An alternative form of
our bounds is given in Table III, for comparison with the
literature.
9To test Fidelity expression
State 1
2
[1
2
+
1
2
√
2
〈ZAZB〉+ 1
4
√
2
〈ZAXB〉+ 1
4
√
2
〈XAZB〉 − 1
8
√
2
〈XAXB〉 − 1
8
〈ZAXAZBXB〉
− 1
8
〈XAZAXBZB〉+ 1
8
〈XAZAZBXB〉+ 1
8
〈ZAXAXBZB〉+ 1
8
√
2
〈ZAXAZAXB〉
+
1
8
√
2
〈XAZBXBZB〉 − 1
4
√
2
〈ZAXAZAZB〉 − 1
4
√
2
〈ZAZBXBZB〉 − 1
8
√
2
〈ZAXAZAZBXBZB〉
]
ZA ⊗ ZB 1
2
[1
2
+
1
2
√
2
〈ZAZB〉+ 1
4
√
2
〈ZAXB〉+ 1
4
√
2
〈XAZB〉 − 1
8
√
2
〈XAXB〉 − 1
8
〈ZAXAZBXB〉
− 1
8
〈XAZAXBZB〉+ 1
8
〈XAZAZBXB〉+ 1
8
〈ZAXAXBZB〉+ 1
8
√
2
〈ZAXAZAXB〉
+
1
8
√
2
〈XAZBXBZB〉 − 1
4
√
2
〈ZAXAZAZB〉 − 1
4
√
2
〈ZAZBXBZB〉 − 1
8
√
2
〈ZAXAZAZBXBZB〉
]
XA ⊗XB 1
2
[1
2
− 1
8
√
2
〈XAXB〉 − 1
4
√
2
〈XAZAXAXB〉 − 1
4
√
2
〈XAXBZBXB〉 − 1
8
〈ZAXAZBXB〉
− 1
8
〈XAZAXBZB〉+ 1
8
〈XAZAZBXB〉+ 1
8
〈ZAXAXBZB〉+ 1
2
√
2
〈XAZAXAXBZBXB〉
+
1
8
√
2
〈XAZAXAZAXAXB〉+ 1
8
√
2
〈XAXBZBXBZBXB〉+ 1
4
√
2
〈XAZAXAZAXAXBZBXB〉
+
1
4
√
2
〈XAZAXAXBZBXBZBXB〉 − 1
8
√
2
〈XAZAXAZAXAXBZBXBZBXB〉
]
ZA ⊗XB
1
2
[1
2
+
1
4
√
2
〈ZAXB〉 − 1
8
√
2
〈XAXB〉+ 1
8
√
2
〈ZAXAZAXB〉 − 1
2
√
2
〈ZAXBZBXB〉
− 1
4
√
2
〈XAXBZBXB〉 − 1
8
〈ZAXAZBXB〉 − 1
8
〈XAZAXBZB〉+ 1
8
〈XAZAZBXB〉
+
1
8
〈ZAXAXBZB〉+ 1
4
√
2
〈ZAXAZAXBZBXB〉 − 1
4
√
2
〈ZAXBZBXBZBXB〉
+
1
8
√
2
〈XAXBZBXBZBXB〉 − 1
8
√
2
〈ZAXAZAXBZBXBZBXB〉
]
TABLE II: Fidelity expressions for the DI setting.
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Theorem 2. The fidelity of the entangled state used for
teleportation in step 7 of Protocol 1 (up to local isometry)
is bounded in the iid setting with probability at least (1−
x) by
F ≥ 1− α
[2
q
+ 
]
, (18)
and in the non-iid setting with probability at least (1 −
x)(1−
√
α[ 2q +

2 +
4q2x log 1+2
2
8q2x log 1+
2 ]) by
F ≥ 1−
√
α
[2
q
+

2
+
4q2x log 1 + 2
2
8q2x log 1 + 
2
]
, (19)
where α = 1.26.
Proof. Our proof extends techniques from [25, 31]. Let us
assume Alice and Bob shareK Bell pairs, partitioned into
n pairs used for testing, and 1 pair used for teleportation.
For each Bell pair, Alice and Bob measure either X ⊗X
or Z ⊗ Z. Note that although we use an untested pair
for teleportation, we will include this in our analysis as
10
Method Trust Inequality State bound State and measurements bound
Reichardt et al. [28] analytical DI CHSH 320
√

McKague et al. [16] analytical DI CHSH 10.91/4 + 3.6
√
 10.91/4 + 13.1
√

Kaniewski [30] analytical DI CHSH 1.18
√

Bancal et al. [23] numerical DI CHSH 1.48
√

Gheorghiu et al. [25] analytical 1sDI steering 2.8
√
+ 0.5 10.8
√
+ 0.5
Sˇupic´ et al. [26] numerical 1sDI CHSH 1.34
√

This work numerical
1sDI steering 1.59
√
 2.49
√

1sDI CHSH 1.34
√
 2.10
√

DI CHSH 1.54
√
 2.72
√

TABLE III: New and existing bounds on trace distance, given an -near-maximal violation of the inequality. The state bound
gives an upper bound on
∥∥Φ(|ψ〉)− ∣∣ψ〉⊗ |anc〉∥∥ ≤√2f(), while the state and measurements bound gives an upper bound on∥∥Φ(MA ⊗NB |ψ〉)− (MA ⊗NB ∣∣ψ〉)⊗ |anc〉∥∥ ≤√2f ′(), where the relation between the bounds is calculated from Equation
(39) of [23]. In the 1sDI case, MA = MA, since we trust Alice’s measurement devices.
a ‘hypothetical measurement’. Since half of the pairs are
measured in X ⊗X and the other half in Z ⊗ Z in each
test round, we have the number of tested pairs measured
in either basis as nXX = nZZ =
n
2 .
For now, we will assume that a pair measured in X⊗X
is used for teleportation and the others for testing, and
the pairs measured in Z ⊗ Z are only used for testing.
We will see later that this assumption does not affect the
results. We also partition K into KXX and KZZ , which
are the total number of pairs measured in each respective
basis. Thus we have KXX = nXX + 1 =
n+2
2 , KZZ =
nZZ =
n
2 .
The ideal correlation for a pair measured in the basis
X⊗X is given by µXX =
〈
ψ
∣∣σX ⊗ σX ∣∣ψ〉, and similarly
for Z ⊗ Z. Note that µXX + µZZ = 2.
The measured correlation in round i is denoted by
Cˆi = aibi, where ai, bi are Alice and Bob’s measurement
outcomes which are either ±1. The average measured
correlation can be written in terms of deviation from
the ideal correlation, denoted by XX , ZZ for the tested
pairs, and ′XX for the pair r used for teleportation, as
1
KXX
KXX∑
i=1
Cˆi =
1
KXX
[ nXX∑
i=1
Cˆi + Cˆr
]
(20)
=
1
KXX
[
nXX(µXX − XX) + µXX − ′XX
]
,
(21)
1
KZZ
KZZ∑
i=1
Cˆi =
1
KZZ
[ nZZ∑
i=1
Cˆi
]
(22)
=
1
KZZ
[
nZZ(µZZ − ZZ)
]
. (23)
Using our tested pairs, the measured correlation
showed a deviation  from the ideal correlation, giving
 = XX + ZZ . We take XX = ZZ =

2 , but any other
choice does not have a significant effect on our results.
We will discuss the hypothetical deviation separately for
the iid and non-iid cases.
The true correlation, or expectation value, in a round i
where X⊗X is measured is denoted by Ci = tr(X⊗Xρi),
and similarly for Z ⊗ Z, where ρi is the shared state in
that round.
Given the -closeness between the ideal and measured
correlation, we now compute the closeness between the
ideal and true correlation over the Bell pairs measured
in X ⊗X and Z ⊗ Z separately. We can then apply our
self-testing result from Theorem 1 to bound the fidelity
of the state. At first, we will assume iid, and then remove
this assumption for the most general scenario.
1. iid setting
In the iid setting, the untrusted components are as-
sumed to behave the same way in each round. This im-
plies that the hypothetical correlation of the untested
pair will be the same as a tested pair (′XX = XX).
Note that this would be the same if we had used a pair
measured in Z ⊗Z for the teleportation. Substituting in
Equations (21) and (23), we get
1
KXX
KXX∑
i=1
Cˆi = µXX − 
2
, (24)
1
KZZ
KZZ∑
i=1
Cˆi = µZZ − 
2
. (25)
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Now, let us consider X ⊗X. We start by defining a vari-
able Wj =
∑j
i=1(Cˆi − Ci), where j ∈ {0, 1, ...,KXX}.
We then use the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound [40, 41] for
approximating the expectation value of independent ran-
dom variables. We have gi ≤ Cˆi ≤ hi, where gi =
−1, hi = 1. This gives
Pr(WKXX ≥ γ) ≤ exp
(
− 2γ
2∑KXX
i=1 (hi − gi)2
)
(26)
≤ exp
(
− γ
2
2KXX
)
. (27)
We choose γ = KXX, which gives
Pr
( 1
KXX
WKXX ≥ 
)
= Pr
( 1
KXX
[KXX∑
i=1
Cˆi −
KXX∑
i=1
Ci
] ≥ ) (28)
= Pr
(
µXX − 
2
− 1
KXX
KXX∑
i=1
Ci ≥ 
)
(29)
≤ exp
(
−1
2
KXX
2
)
. (30)
Thus, we have
Pr
( 1
KXX
KXX∑
i=1
Ci − µXX ≥ −3
2

)
≥ 1− exp
(
−1
2
KXX
2
)
.
(31)
Similar calculations for Z ⊗ Z give us
Pr
( 1
KZZ
KZZ∑
i=1
Ci − µZZ ≥ −3
2

)
≥ 1− exp
(
−1
2
KZZ
2
)
. (32)
Let ρavg =
1
K
∑K
i=1 ρi be the average state over all K Bell
pairs, including the one used for teleportation. Since the
states in each round are identical in the iid setting, ρavg =
ρi. We define the following averaged true correlations:
CXX =
1
KXX
KXX∑
i=1
Ci, C
ZZ =
1
KZZ
KZZ∑
i=1
Ci. (33)
We now rephrase Equations (31) and (32) as
Pr
(
CXX − µXX ≥ −3
2

)
≥ 1− exp
(
−1
4
(n+ 2)2
)
,
(34)
Pr
(
CZZ − µZZ ≥ −3
2

)
≥ 1− exp
(
−1
4
n2
)
. (35)
The true correlation for the averaged state when mea-
sured in the X ⊗ X basis is given by CXX = tr(X ⊗
Xρavg), and similarly for Z ⊗ Z. Combining Equations
(34) and (35), we get
CXX + CZZ − (µXX + µZZ) ≥ −3
2
− 3
2
 (36)
CXX + CZZ ≥ 2− 3 (37)
≥ 2− δ, (38)
with probability ≥ [1 − exp(− 14 (n+ 2)2)][1 −
exp
(− 14n2)] ≥ 1− exp(− 14n2), and where δ = 3.
If |ζ〉 is a purification of ρavg, we get
〈ζ|X ⊗X|ζ〉+ 〈ζ|Z ⊗ Z|ζ〉 ≥ 2− δ, (39)
with probability ≥ 1− exp(− 14n2). Our self-testing re-
sult in Theorem 1 tells us that given such a correlation
in expectation values, we have for α = 1.26,
F (trB [Φ(|ζ〉 〈ζ|)],
∣∣ψ〉) ≥ 1− αδ, (40)
with probability ≥ 1− exp(− 14n2). This gives
F (trB [Φ(ρavg)],
∣∣ψ〉) ≥ 1− αδ, (41)
with probability ≥ 1 − exp(− 14n2). If we set n =
4
2 log
1
 , we get F (trB [Φ(ρavg)],
∣∣ψ〉) ≥ 1−αδ, with prob-
ability ≥ 1− . We rewrite this as follows, recalling that
ρavg = ρi in the iid setting:
F (trB [Φ(ρi)],
∣∣ψ〉) ≥ 1− α[3], (42)
with probability ≥ 1 − . The total number of pairs we
need in our protocol is then K = 42 log
1
 + 1.
Since our focus is on developing a protocol that can
be implemented in the lab, we will now further optimise
this analysis given our experimental limitations. If it is
very difficult for us to observe a high violation of the
steering inequality, but we are not limited in the number
of pairs we can generate, then we can modify the above
analysis as follows. We now choose γ = KXX

q in our
Chernoff-Hoeffding bound, which gives
Pr
( 1
KXX
WKXX ≥

q
)
≤ exp
(
− 1
2q2
KXX
2
)
. (43)
Going through the calculations as above, we obtain
Pr
( 1
KXX
KXX∑
i=1
Ci − µXX ≥ − 
q
− 
2
)
≥ 1− exp
(
− 1
2q2
KXX
2
)
. (44)
Similarly for Z ⊗ Z, we get
Pr
( 1
KZZ
KZZ∑
i=1
Ci − µZZ ≥ − 
q
− 
2
)
≥ 1− exp
(
− 1
2q2
KZZ
2
)
. (45)
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This gives us CXX + CZZ ≥ 2 − δ with probability ≥
1 − exp
(
− 14q2n2
)
, where δ = 2q + . If we now set
n = 4q
2x
2 log
1
 , this gives us
F (trB [Φ(ρi)],
∣∣ψ〉) ≥ 1− α[2
q
+ 
]
, (46)
with probability ≥ 1− x. The total number of pairs we
need in our protocol is then K = 4q
2x
2 log
1
 + 1. Note
that as q, x → ∞, the expression for fidelity reduces to
the self-testing result of F ≥ 1− α with probability 1.
2. Non-iid setting
Now, we no longer assume the same behaviour
throughout the rounds. We first determine the hypo-
thetical correlation of the untested pair. We consider
the worst case scenario i.e. the maximum possible error.
Since µXX = 1, this then gives 
′
XX = 2. Note that we
get this same value if we had used the Z ⊗ Z pair for
teleportation. Substituting in Equations (21) and (23),
we get
1
KXX
KXX∑
i=1
Cˆi = µXX −
[ 8 + n
2n+ 4
]
, (47)
1
KZZ
KZZ∑
i=1
Cˆi = µZZ − 
2
. (48)
The true correlation Ci now depends on the history of
the measurements made, which we denote Hi, and so we
can also write this as
Ci = Pr(ai = bi|Hi)− Pr(ai 6= bi|Hi). (49)
We have |Wj+1 −Wj | ≤ 2, since Cˆi = ±1,−1 ≤ Ci ≤ 1.
The expectation value of Wj is finite, and the conditional
expected value E(Wj+1|Hj) = Wj . Thus, {Wj} is a
martingale. We can use the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality
[41, 42] here, which gives us for |Wj+1 −Wj | ≤ di:
Pr(WKXX ≥ γ) ≤ exp
(
− γ
2
2
∑KXX
i=1 d
2
i
)
(50)
≤ exp
(
− γ
2
8KXX
)
. (51)
We again choose γ = KXX, which gives
Pr
( 1
KXX
WKXX ≥ 
)
≤ exp
(
−1
8
KXX
2
)
, (52)
Pr
( 1
KXX
KXX∑
i=1
Ci − µXX ≥ −3n+ 8 + 4
2n+ 4
)
≥ 1− exp
(
−1
8
KXX
2
)
. (53)
For Z ⊗ Z, we get
Pr
( 1
KZZ
KZZ∑
i=1
Ci − µZZ ≥ −3
2

)
≥ 1− exp
(
−1
8
KZZ
2
)
.
(54)
We substitute for KXX ,KZZ and obtain 〈ζ|X ⊗X|ζ〉+
〈ζ|Z ⊗ Z|ζ〉 ≥ 2−δ with probability ≥ 1−exp(− 116n2),
where δ = 3n+4+5n+2 .
If we now set n = 162 log
1
 and use our self-testing
result from Theorem 1, we get
F (trB [Φ(ρavg)],
∣∣ψ〉) ≥ 1− αδ, (55)
with probability ≥ 1− .
Note that here, ρavg is not equal to ρi, since we do not
assume the source behaves the same way in each round.
Thus, in order to characterise the state in any round, we
will extend Lemma 5 of [25] as follows.
Lemma 4. Let ρavg =
1
K
∑K
i=1 ρi. If, for some pure
state |Ψ〉, we have that
F (ρavg, |Ψ〉) ≥ 1− η, (56)
then for a uniformly at random chosen i ∈ {1, ...,K},
with probability at least 1−√η we can bound the fidelity
by
F (ρi, |Ψ〉) ≥ 1−√η. (57)
Proof. We can write F (ρavg, |Ψ〉) ≥ 1− η as
1
K
K∑
i=1
F (ρi, |Ψ〉) ≥ 1− η. (58)
We wish to find a bound on any F (ρi, |Ψ〉), given this
bound on the average F (ρi, |Ψ〉). Let us take p to be
the fraction of i’s such that F (ρi, |Ψ〉) ≤ 1 − η − β, and
(1 − p) to be the fraction of i’s such that F (ρi, |Ψ〉) ≥
1 − η − β. We take this to be the worst case scenario,
so F (ρi, |Ψ〉) = 1 with probability (1 − p). We can then
write
1
K
K∑
i=1
F (ρi, |Ψ〉) ≤ p× (1− η − β) + (1− p)× 1 (59)
1− η ≤ p× (1− η − β) + 1− p. (60)
This gives p ≤ ηη+β , and 1−p ≥ βη+β . Thus, if we choose
a random i, then with probability ≥ βη+β its fidelity can
be lower-bounded by F (ρi, |Ψ〉) ≥ 1− η − β. We choose
β =
√
η − η, which gives
F (ρi, |Ψ〉) ≥ 1−√η, (61)
with probability ≥ 1−√η.
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FIG. 2: Certifying fidelities of the entangled state for 1sDI and DI authenticated teleportation, in the iid (solid line) and non-iid
(dashed line) settings, requires (a) a CHSH inequality violation of 2
√
2 − , and (b) at least K states. The classical bound
(dotted line) corresponds to a fidelity of 2
3
.
Applying Lemma 4 to our scenario, we obtain
F (trB [Φ(ρi)],
∣∣ψ〉) ≥ 1−√αδ, (62)
with probability ≥ (1− )(1−√αδ).
Writing δ in terms of , we have our final result that
the state ρi in any round, including the one used for
teleportation, is such that
F (trB [Φ(ρi)],
∣∣ψ〉) ≥ 1−√α[48 log 1 + 42 + 53
16 log 1 + 2
2
]
,
(63)
with probability ≥ (1− )(1−
√
α
[
48 log 1+4
2+53
16 log 1+2
2
]
).
The total number of pairs we need in our protocol is
then K = 162 log
1
 + 1.
If we wish to optimise this further given our experi-
mental limitations, we can do a similar modification to
the above analysis as in the iid setting, which gives us
F (trB [Φ(ρi)],
∣∣ψ〉) ≥ 1−√α[2
q
+

2
+
4q2x log 1 + 2
2
8q2x log 1 + 
2
]
,
(64)
with probability ≥ (1 − x)(1 −√
α
[
2
q +

2 +
4q2x log 1+2
2
8q2x log 1+
2
]
).
The total number of pairs used in the protocol is K =
16q2x
2 log
1
 + 1.
APPENDIX C: RESULTS USING THE CHSH
INEQUALITY
In the 1sDI setting of Protocol 1, the parties can also
use the CHSH inequality instead of the steering inequal-
ity. We then state the analogous statement to Theorem
2 and Corollary 3 here, for which the proof follows by the
same method as above.
Theorem 5. Alice and Bob perform Protocol 1 but using
the CHSH inequality. In the iid setting, if they share
8q2x
2 log
1
 + 1 pairs, then the fidelity of teleportation is
bounded with probability at least (1− x) by
F ≥ 1− α
[4
q
+ 
]
, (65)
and in the non-iid setting, if they share
32q2x
2 log
1
 + 1 pairs, then the fidelity of tele-
portation is bounded with probability at least
(1− x)(1−
√
α
[
4
q +
3
4 +
4q2x log 1+(2+
√
2)2
16q2x log 1+2
2
]
) by
F ≥ 1−
√
α
[4
q
+
3
4
+
4q2x log 1 + (2 +
√
2)2
16q2x log 1 + 2
2
]
,
(66)
where α = 0.90.
Note that we do not use the fact that one party’s de-
vices may be trusted apart from when we apply the SDP
result. Thus, in the DI setting, Theorem 5 holds with
α = 1.19, using the same number of pairs as specified
there. This can be used to do a fully device-independent
test of the Bell pair, useful for various applications.
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In Figure 2, we compare the parameters required in
the 1sDI and DI trust scenarios, under the iid and non-
iid assumptions. In the 1sDI case, from Corollary 3, this
fidelity bound holds for the fidelity of teleportation. In
the DI case, one must also consider Alice’s Bell state
measurement in order to make such a statement; thus,
this remains a bound on the entangled state.
